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Abstract
This article argues in favour of the triangulation of emic and etic methods in the 
comparative study of culture, taking China as a case. Starting from an indig-
enous theory of cultural comparisons, Fei Xiaotong's concepts of 'group pattern' 
(tuanti geju) versus 'differential pattern' (chaxu geju), I review the contemporary 
literature on 'collectivism' in social psychology and management sciences. The 
article shows that Fei anticipated major revisions of this concept, resulting into 
a multi-aspectual approach that distinguishes 'individualism', 'collectivism', 
'vertical/horizontal relations' and 'relational/categorial embeddedness'. In this 
frame, Fei's characterisation of Chinese culture can be restated in terms of the 
aspects of 'individualism', 'relational embeddedness' and 'verticality'. I argue 
that Fei's anticipation of modern research may be rooted in a feedback of culture-
bound cognition to theory formation. Taking Chinese networks and Chinese 
popular religion as examples, the validity of this approach is further conﬁrmed.
Keywords: Chinese culture, collectivism, Fei Xiaotong, ﬁeld dependence, guanxi, 
Chinese religion
Introduction
The study of culture is cross-disciplinary in essence, though this does 
not mean that the various disciplines communicate among each other 
and strive to establish a genuinely transdisciplinary approach.1 In this 
article, I try to develop a transdisciplinary perspective on Chinese cul-
ture, drawing on various resources and insights − in particular from 
psychology, management sciences, sociology and anthropology − and 
relate these to one of the most inﬂuential indigenous theories of Chi-
nese culture: the theory of the 'differential mode of association' (chaxu 
geju), proposed by the eminent Chinese sociologist Fei Xiaotong 70 
years ago.2 I aim towards an integration of etic and emic approaches 
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to culture, arguing in favour of a balance between 'indigenization' and 
'universalization' in the study of culture.3 Many approaches to culture 
try to establish an etic frame of reference for locating different cultures, 
even claiming that it is possible to quantify cultural differences. The 
emic perspective is mostly elaborated in the humanities and cultural 
studies, relying on interpretive and hermeneutic approaches. In this 
article, I adopt an emic perspective, in a double sense: 1) to look at an 
indigenous theory of cultural comparison and 2) to use this theory in 
re-arranging the results of the etic research. I do not present original 
research on cultural differences in the sense of new primary data, surveys 
or experiments, but rather develop a new interpretive frame that builds 
on an indigenous theory. I will show that such an integration might 
build upon more foundational phenomena in cognition (as seminally 
proposed by Hong and Chiu 2001).
The lack of cross-disciplinary communication mainly reﬂects diver-
gent methodological standards. In particular, economics and manage-
ment science rely heavily on quantitative methods in order to gauge the 
impact of culture on individual behaviour or larger patterns of social 
phenomena (for recent surveys of this research, see Guiso et al. 2006 
or Beugelsdijk and Maseland 2010). In doing this, they often use input 
from psychology, which also values measurement and experiments. 
Beyond this, economics and management sciences rarely, if ever, take 
insights from cultural studies or anthropology, which mostly concen-
trate on 'thick description' of ongoing changes in Chinese society, into 
consideration.
My workhorse in this article is the 'individualism vs. collectivism' 
dichotomy, which has paradigmatic status, especially in comparative 
research about 'East Asian Culture' vis-à-vis 'Western culture'. Thinking 
in terms of this dichotomy is extremely inﬂuential in the management 
sciences and psychology, exerts strong impact on special ﬁelds such as 
cross-cultural management, and has thus eventually become common-
place in training courses for expats, diplomats and other highly mobile 
professionals. In addition, statements like 'the Chinese are collectivists' 
often go hand in hand with labelling China a 'Confucian' country. The 
implications of such characterisations are profound as they also impact, 
for example, on evaluations of political culture, such as when the Chinese 
are regarded as being culturally inclined towards accepting authoritar-
ian rule based on strong collectivist moral norms.
At the same time, the topic of individualism has emerged as a vibrant 
research issue in Chinese studies, informed by sociology and anthro-
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pology and mostly based on detailed case studies (for a representative 
collection of papers, see Hansen and Svarverud 2010 or Kipnis 2012). 
Whether and how 'the Chinese' are becoming more 'individualistic' as a 
result of the ongoing seismic changes and disruptions in the past seven 
decades of Communist Party rule in China is a fascinating, if not close to 
paradoxical, question. This is because, as Yan Yunxiang has argued in 
a number of seminal contributions, 'modernisation' in China continues 
to be state-led and even the active promotion of 'individualistic' values 
and behaviours takes place within the context of what basically remains 
an authoritarian system of political and social governance.4 The para-
dox springs to the eye: implicitly or explicitly many observers of China 
believe that China is moving from a more 'collectivistic' society towards 
a more 'individualistic' one. However, this move is being orchestrated 
within a larger political framework, which apparently remains strongly 
'collectivistic' not only in ideological terms, but also with regard to many 
social practices, for example, in the education system.
In this article, I approach these issues from the perspective of Fei 
Xiaotong's comparative theory of Chinese society. This theory exerts 
a strong inﬂuence on Chinese sociology and anthropology, though it 
is treated as controversial, especially with regard to its relationship to 
modernisation, as it is empirically grounded in Fei's research on rural 
society.5 However, as pointed out by Gary Hamilton (2014), by and 
large it has only been partially received; Fei's parallel account of West-
ern society is rarely even considered, as also noted by Yan Yunxiang 
(2006). This is a major focus of my argument. Fei's theory is an impor-
tant contribution to the comparative study of culture, because it sheds 
a different light on categories for classifying cultures that originated in 
Western research.
The article proceeds as follows. I begin with a brief outline of Fei's 
theory. Next, I summarise recent developments in research on individu-
alism and collectivism, resulting in a multifaceted view that concurs 
with Fei's  theory. Thus, I claim that Fei's theory offers a more powerful 
conceptual frame for cross-cultural comparisons than the standard dual-
ism of individualism vs. collectivism. I explore the deeper foundations 
of this approach in modern cognitive science approaches to culture, 
thus anchoring the emic perspective in an etic approach, concluding my 
methodological triangulation. I apply the new perspective to two topics 
in which issues of emic analysis and comparisons between Western and 
Chinese notions loom large: the concept of 'networks' as guanxi, and 
how to conceptualize 'religion' in China.
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Fei Xiaotong's Theory of Chinese vs. Western Society
Fei Xiaotong (1910-2005) was one of the most inﬂuential Chinese sociolo-
gists of the twentieth century. He studied anthropology with Radcliffe-
Brown and Malinowski in England, later returning to China for ﬁeld-
work that is documented in important English-language publications 
(Fei 1939, Fei and Chang 1945). Based on his village studies, he developed 
new concepts for rural development, especially rural industrialisation 
and township development. Like most returned intellectuals, he suf-
fered extreme repression during the Cultural Revolution, but after his 
rehabilitation his ideas became very inﬂuential in the design of rural 
economic reforms. In his book Xiangtu Zhongguo (English translation: 
From the Soil. The Foundations of Chinese Society, see note 2), Fei develops 
a theory of Chinese and Western culture that builds on the idea that the 
patterns of group formation differ cross-culturally. In Chinese studies 
Fei is mostly known for his distinctive analysis of Chinese society in 
terms of his neologism chaxu geju: the second term just means 'pattern', 
whereas the ﬁrst term is complex and often misunderstood. The term 
'cha' refers to horizontal social relations, in the sense of distances between 
individuals in concentric social networks, and the term 'xu' refers to 
the vertical dimension, in the sense of a rank order. As such, the term 
remains abstract and almost devoid of speciﬁc meaning. It only gains 
signiﬁcance in the comparative context.
Fei proposes the term 'group pattern' for describing Western society; 'tu-
anti geju' means that Western societies emphasise ascriptive ties to abstract 
collectives as compared to Chinese society, which emphasises relations 
among concrete people (what Fei calls 'social circles' or shehui quanzi). 
Interestingly, Fei does not refer to the distinction between individuals and 
groups in the ﬁrst place, but to two different principles of group formation. 
This introduces a fresh perspective on cross-cultural comparisons as Fei 
does not treat 'individualism' (geren zhuyi) as the foundational criterion 
for characterising Western society as different from China.6
Accordingly, he also posits two different forms of individual-oriented 
behaviour. 'Individualism', in this more general sense, is not opposed 
to the notion of the group, but appears to be a concept that refers back 
to the speciﬁc pattern of group formation, hence to agency. So, in his 
view, 'individualism' in the Western sense approaches individuals as 
being 'equal' in terms of abstract membership criteria, which implies that 
individual agency is actually a derivative of the group (so, for example, 
being conceived as being based on 'rights'). Fei even states that the group 
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is therefore primordial for Western individualism. In contrast, Chinese 
society is classiﬁed as 'egocentric' (ziwozhuyi), implying that agency and 
values are exclusively related in the 'self' (ji). The distinction is that West-
ern individualism, in treating individuals as abstract members of groups 
deﬁned by categories (such as 'the nation'), actually adopts a 'decentred' 
perspective on the individual, whereas Chinese society emphasises the 
pivotal position of ego in deﬁning the nature of personal relationships, 
and thus deﬁnes every individual according to positions in these different 
egocentric networks, thus as 'unequal' per se. One important implication 
is that in the Western case, the entire set of social relations is seen as being 
embedded in an encompassing order deﬁned on the level of the categorial 
group (for example, individuals being citizens of a nation), whereas in 
the Chinese case social order consists of the entire set of individualised, 
'egocentric', and overlapping social circles.
In a famous remark, Fei described social relations in China as the 
ripples that appear in a lake when pebbles are thrown into it; the rip-
ples overlap and interfere with each other. We can interpret his theory 
in terms of two different patterns of network formation (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Chinese and Western networks
Western Networks
Chinese Networks
FIGURE 1. Chinese and Western networks.
In the Western network, nodes (individuals) and relations or connec-
tions are clearly separated, and certain nodes may form groups that are 
neatly delineated by group borders deﬁned by categories. In the Chinese 
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network, nodes are centres of circles that can expand or shrink (indig-
enously denoted as 'small self' (xiao wo) vs. 'big self' (da wo), see Chang 
and Lee 2012). Groups are established by the interferences between the 
circles, and thus have fuzzy borders.
Fei claims that this distinction raises important methodological is-
sues in Chinese studies, because speciﬁc kinds of groups differ. A case 
in point is his discussion of the family and the lineage. Fei criticises 
the standard notion of the family and the lineage in Western social sci-
ence because it supposes a neat vertical integration and clearly deﬁned 
membership criteria. On the contrary, the Chinese notions are fuzzy and 
open-ended, adapting to the functional needs that emerge in speciﬁc 
social and economic contexts.7
What I have discussed so far is the cha 'distance' aspect of chaxugeju. 
The xu 'rank' aspect has already been introduced (the conceptualisation 
of society as being structured by hierarchical distinctions) and remains 
always deﬁned as relative to ego, and not relative to an abstract collec-
tive. So Fei combines egocentrism with verticality and adds his notion of 
social relations. The hierarchical aspect relates to another fundamental 
distinction that Fei introduces, namely between 'ritual' (li) and 'law' 
(fa). He argues that Western views falsely suggest a dichotomy of so-
cial order between 'rule by men' vs. 'rule by law', whereas the Chinese 
case suggests a third alternative, rule by ritual. Ritual is a set of social 
mores, customs or even customary laws, which is not enforced by a 
political body, such as the state, and which is adopted via socialisation 
in groups, speciﬁcally the village. The main role of ritual is to deﬁne a 
rank order.8
Accordingly, in dealing with Fei's theory, one limitation needs to be 
considered: Fei argues that the Chinese model of 'ritual' mainly applies 
for village society, as it rests upon custom and personalised relation-
ships, and cannot work in a modern urban society. In this sense, the 
'rule of law' also appears to be the standard towards which Chinese 
modernisation will inevitably converge. However, in this juxtaposi-
tion between rural and urban society Fei does not consider the fact that 
already in Imperial China, ritual was deeply enmeshed with law and 
also played an important role in urban society. This critical reﬂection 
opens up perspectives on generalising from Fei's theory as a cross-
cultural framework for considering contemporary culture as well (see 
also Yan 2006).
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Beyond Individualism and Collectivism: Recent 
Research in Social Psychology
If we compare Fei's theory with recent comparative approaches to 
culture in 'Western' research, it is immediately apparent that the direct 
juxtaposition of 'individualism' vs. 'collectivism' looms large. Typically, 
Western society is described as being more 'individualistic' and Chinese 
society as 'group oriented'. This is also often approached in terms of a 
polarity in one single dimension. Accordingly, cultural change is often 
perceived as a process of 'individualisation', shifting from 'collectivism' 
to 'individualism'.
The distinction between individualism and collectivism is one of the 
best validated conceptualisations of cultural differences across countries 
and is used as an analytical commonplace across many disciplines. In 
management science and its applications, is Geert Hofstede devised one 
of the most inﬂuential approaches, also widely taught in cross-cultural 
training courses.9 Hofstede uses a set of survey questions to identify 
degrees of individualism vs. collectivism within one single dimension. 
As is well known, China scores very low in individualism, and high in 
other relevant dimensions, especially 'power distance' (the attitudes of 
people towards higher level authorities). However, during the past three 
decades, China has also played an important role in driving modiﬁca-
tions and amendments of the Hofstede approach. This is because when 
the Hong Kong-based psychologist Michael Bond designed a 'Chinese 
Value Survey' based on different survey data, he could basically conﬁrm 
Hofstede's identiﬁcation of four cultural dimensions (individualism, 
power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity). However, 
he also discovered that there is another mediating dimension, which 
was then introduced as the 'ﬁfth dimension' into the Hofstede scheme, 
namely 'long-term orientation'. In this dimension, East Asian societies 
lead all other nations in the world. However, the dimension also proved 
to be statistically unstable, so that in the most recent versions of the 
Hofstede approach, this dimension was partitioned into two, 'long-term 
orientation' and 'indulgence'. China scores very high in the former and 
low in the latter.10 
In management science, another very inﬂuential study is the GLOBE 
survey, which concentrates on the issue of leadership in business, but 
includes broader perspectives on culture and society.11 The GLOBE 
survey keeps the distinction between individualism and collectivism, 
yet adds two modiﬁcations that are important in the context of my dis-
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cussion. The ﬁrst is distinguishing between behaviour and practices as 
they actually occur in different societies ('as is') and values as norma-
tive expectations ('as should be'). The second is distinguishing between 
'institutional collectivism' and 'in-group collectivism'. The former refers 
to individual expectations regarding institutionalised patterns of group-
oriented behaviour, such as redistribution by the government. The latter 
relates to behaviour in the context of individual reference groups such 
as family and kin.
The distinction between practices and values is of great methodo-
logical importance in value surveys because a value proposition can 
be either a statement about what is appreciated as actual practice or an 
assertion about a desirable state that is not actualised in practice. This 
means, for example, that a 'collectivist' might be either somebody who 
appreciates current collectivistic practices, or somebody who desires a 
strengthening of collectivism, compared to actual practice. As a result 
of this ambivalence, comparisons across countries can become very 
difﬁcult.12 According to the GLOBE survey, China scores high in the 
'societal institutional practices' dimension, where it compares with 
countries such as Sweden or Ireland, as well as with other so-called 
'Confucian countries'. China's 'societal collectivism values' score is close 
to the practices score, but the comparative country pattern differs con-
siderably from the values perspective. In terms of values, China does 
not belong to the group with the highest scores, which includes many 
Latin American and South European countries, and only Taiwan (score 
5.15, compared with Mainland China's 4.56) of the so-called 'Confucian' 
countries. China groups together not only with Germany, but even with 
the Netherlands (score 4.55), which is the prototypical 'individualistic' 
country in the Hofstede approach (individualism score 80 vs. China's 
20). Regarding the 'in-group collectivism values' score, the results are 
astounding, because all countries score at a relatively high level, but 
China is actually the third lowest value in the entire set (5.09), which 
would nevertheless imply an appreciation against practices. Yet, the 
group with lowest scores includes Germany, the Netherlands or South 
Africa, whereas the countries with the highest scores are mostly Latin 
American ones, and also, for example, New Zealand. 
The GLOBE approach raises another important question that is also 
discussed by Hofstede, namely whether the measurement of values 
covers individual-level phenomena or only society-level ones, which 
could also be understood as the distinction between 'psychological' and 
'sociological' conceptualisations of values. Psychologists have always 
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been very sensitive towards this distinction, therefore we ﬁnd another 
conceptualisation here, referring exclusively the to individual level: 
'idiocentrism' and 'allocentrism' (Triandis 1989). As I will argue later in 
more detail, the distinction between psychological and societal levels 
is extremely important for understanding the impact of institutions on 
current behaviour and the potential channels through which certain 
values are transferred across generations. Although on the one hand 
Hofstede observes this difference, on the other he argues that culturally 
transmitted values amount to 'mental programming', so leaving no lee-
way for psychological phenomena to differ from what might just be an 
institutionally determined behaviour.13 This question is important for 
Chinese studies, since regarding the collectivism dimension, we need to 
recognise an extremely disruptive institutional change in the past three 
decades. One of the paradigms for understanding Chinese society in 
the 1980s, Walder's 'communist neotraditionalism', clearly emphasised 
the role of institutions in determining psychological attitudes such as 
'organized dependence'.14 Today, Yan Yunxiang highlights the fact that 
individualism is rising in Chinese society because of state-imposed 
changes of institutions.15
In psychology, the simple dualism of 'individualism' and 'collectiv-
ism' has been thoroughly questioned in recent decades. This reﬂects 
the fact that in the original Hofstede approach, 'individualism' appears 
as mostly characterising a certain number of Western protestant socie-
ties, whereas collectivism often goes along with large power distance, 
a combination which covers a very large number of countries which 
vary widely in cultural terms. In other words, the Hofstede cultural 
scores are not sufﬁcient for identifying cultural differences within this 
large group. Further, if one goes back to the original survey questions 
in identifying collectivism, these questions often appear to be much less 
speciﬁc to collectivistic norms than the apparently clear-cut conclusions 
suggest.16
One particularly difﬁcult problem is that in many psychological 
experiments 'individualistic' individuals can also manifest strongly 
collectivistic behaviour. Further, it is difﬁcult to disentangle the impact 
of other dimensions on the individualism/collectivism distinction. 
Hofstede often suggests that certain behaviours which might appear 
'collectivistic' in cases that have been characterised as 'individualistic' 
societies allegedly reﬂect different degrees of power distance or mascu-
linity.17 In order to clear up this confusion, two additional distinctions 
have been introduced in the literature. 
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The ﬁrst is 'verticality' versus 'horizontality', which applies for both 
collectivism and individualism and identiﬁes different expressions of the 
two fundamental values in different societal contexts.18 It is important 
to note that these additional distinctions vary independently, so that 
we can have the juxtaposition of a 'vertically individualistic' society and 
a 'vertically collectivistic society', or we can have the juxtaposition of 
a 'vertically' vs. a 'horizontally collectivistic' society, for example. The 
criterion of 'verticality' catches what is a relatively murky interaction 
between power distance and individualism/collectivism in the Hofst-
ede framework. A vertical form of both individualism and collectivism 
means that society is geared towards the emphasis of status differences 
between individuals and emphasises competitive behaviour in advanc-
ing in the status hierarchy, whereas in a horizontal society, individuals 
mutually respect each other and aim at creating a cooperative environ-
ment allowing for equal opportunities in self-expression. Vertical indi-
vidualism results in behaviour that is strongly competitive in pursuing 
individual achievement goals, whereas vertical collectivism emphasises 
authority relations in groups which in turn may stay in a competitive 
relationship with other groups. In comparison, horizontal individual-
ism will emphasise individual emotional needs and self-expression in 
interpersonal relations.
It is straightforward to recognise that these distinctions help to clarify 
some empirical difﬁculties with the original Hofstede dichotomy. Tak-
ing the US and China as examples, the US is classiﬁed as a vertically 
individualistic country, whereas China might appear to be vertically 
collectivistic, on ﬁrst sight. Between both societies, however, certain 
phenomena might be similar as compared to horizontal individualistic 
Scandinavian countries, for example. This is particularly the case with 
competitive behaviour in status hierarchies, or social acceptance of 
expressions of status differences, such as wealth.
The second distinction that has been introduced in the recent litera-
ture goes back to research in social psychology that questions another 
aspect of the original individualism/collectivism dichotomy, which has 
been partly recognised in the GLOBE survey. This is that collectivism 
may refer to two different kinds of groups, namely abstract categories 
of people versus interacting networks of people. So, we can distin-
guish between 'categorial collectivism' vs. 'relational collectivism'.19 
Categorial collectivism means that individuals assign themselves to 
abstract categories such as the nation, the company or the race, which 
are 'groups' of much wider scope than networks of actually interact-
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ing, even similar, people (in large companies, members do not interact 
with everybody). In contrast, relational collectivism refers to patterns 
of actual interaction, such as networks of friendship or professionals in 
a department within a large company. Further, this literature argues 
that individualism and collectivism refer to two qualitatively different 
psychological phenomena: individualism relates to ideas about agency, 
collectivism is a value system. This means that the two do not belong to 
one dimension and hence can combine freely. Thus, there can be new 
combinations with the individualism feature, because, for example, 
categorial collectivism about values may combine with individualism 
about agency in certain cultural settings. For example, considering the 
fact that Hofstede originally concentrated on work environments, there 
are many results showing that Americans, though appearing to be the 
classical individualists elsewhere, manifest strong 'categorial collectiv-
ism' in a work environment, thus strong loyalty to the organisation, 
and suppressing expressions of individual emotions in their relations 
with others. In contrast, the Chinese also emphasise the importance of 
individual emotional satisfaction in work-related interactions.20 
The question emerges whether we can also apply this distinction to the 
notion of individualism. Relational individualism would then refer to 
behaviour by which individual goals are mainly satisﬁed in interactions 
with other people, and categorial individualism would concentrate on 
more abstract relationships, such as achieving certain professional goals 
deﬁned in individualistic terms. This possibility has been explored in 
earlier Chinese studies contributions, which introduced notions such 
as 'relational personalism'.21
Summarising the results of this section, we end up with a multi-aspec-
tual space in which we can locate individual values and behaviour:
• Verticality vs. horizontality
• Categorial vs. relational embeddedness
• individualism 
• collectivism
Regarding individualism, this refers to where individual motivation, 
criteria for achievement and notions of agency are located, in the indi-
vidual or the collective. Thus, the category comes close to more abstract 
notions such as 'autonomy'. We now have a much larger number of 
possible combinations, such as, for example, individualism, relational 
embeddedness and verticality, as compared to collectivism, categorial 
embeddedness and horizontality. Individualism and collectivism are 
no longer two poles in one single dimension.
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In discussing these observations, I do not raise an empirical claim in 
the ﬁrst place, but a conceptual and even philosophical one. Empiri-
cally, we would identify certain 'types' of society not via these abstract 
categorisations but via a historical-genetic approach. This distinction is 
mostly blurred in research on values. For example, in our context, the 
GLOBE survey only characterises one group of societies by referring to a 
certain philosophy, Confucianism. Others are simply grouped together 
by geographical criteria. Without reﬂecting upon these different typolo-
gies, in the case of the 'Confucianism' group, the hypothesis is submitted 
that all these societies were shaped by one particular ideological system, 
namely Confucianism, over a very long time span.22 This raises the im-
portant question of how indigenous conceptualisations of values and 
social structure relate to the theoretical psychological categorisations, 
whether we can establish a correspondence between emic and etic ap-
proaches (Kulich and Zhang 2010).
If we reﬂect upon this result in the context of Fei Xiaotong's theory, it 
is straightforward to see that Fei anticipated these recent developments 
in social psychology. He analysed Chinese culture in both the aspects of 
individualism and the patterns of group formation, with the relational 
type clearly corresponding to his concept of 'circles'. A generic concep-
tion of 'individualism' does not help to distinguish between Chinese and 
Western culture, as there are also different forms of agency related to the 
dynamics of group formation. Further, Fei's notion of chaxu highlights 
a particular form of vertical order. 
This observation raises an interesting question: why does Fei recog-
nise certain structural principles in the comparative study of culture 
that were only gradually discovered by research in social psychology 
decades later? One interesting hypothesis would be that this is, in turn, 
rooted in cultural differences that become manifest in the way theories 
in social science and psychology are formed. More speciﬁcally, cultural 
forms of cognition may inﬂuence both the way theories are formed and 
how behaviour is shaped. I will explore this idea in the next section.
Culture and Cognition
In spite of the clear evidence against 'collectivism' as a simple char-
acterisation of Chinese culture, the question is still open how we can 
reconcile this insight with case-related evidence and speciﬁc survey 
results that highlight apparently 'collectivistic' attitudes. As we have 
seen, one important issue in the original surveys is whether the results 
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actually catch individual-level psychological variables or society-level 
values that are to a large degree institutionalised. What is the connection 
between the two levels? How far do 'internal' or 'external determinants' 
drive behavioural phenomena?
One way to connect the two is to introduce the notion of 'framing', 
which has become very prominent in behavioural economics recently. 
In economics, 'values' are conceptualised as 'preferences', institutions 
as 'constraints'; the traditional distinction between 'individualism' and 
'collectivism' corresponds to the distinction between 'individual' and 
'social preferences', with the latter seen as 'other-regarding preferences' 
or as preferences that are socially shaped and embedded. Recent re-
search has presented evidence that there are strong framing effects on 
the individual level. This means, depending on the frame, that the same 
individuals manifest different degrees and combinations of individual 
and social preferences.23 This insight matches with the ecological theory 
of culture proposed by Yamagishi (2012). In this theory, individuals act 
as 'cultural game players' who adapt their behaviour to certain cues and 
signals they receive from the environment. In his comparisons between 
Japanese and Western subjects, he reached the conclusion that East 
Asians are not 'collectivistic' or 'individualistic' per se, but that they 
act in a collectivistic way if they receive certain information about the 
context of their actions, in particular about the expectations of others. 
For example, Japanese subjects show even stronger 'individualistic' 
behaviour than Caucasians if they act in an anonymous setting.24
Therefore, one way to reconcile the different data is to dig deeper 
into the cognitive determinants of social perceptions and decisions that 
connect frames with behaviour. Yamagishi follows Nisbett here, and 
argues that there are two fundamentally different cognitive stances: 
ﬁeld dependence vs. ﬁeld independence.25 Apparently, 'collectivistic' 
behaviour appears more often under conditions of ﬁeld dependence 
because individuals pay more attention to social context and cues about 
the behaviour of others. For example, in one experiment Chinese and 
American subjects react differently to the same framing because they 
manifest different tendencies to cheat if they learn about the readiness 
of others to cooperate. This means that whereas the Americans appear 
to act ﬁeld-independent in taking the immediate incentives for cheating 
as predominant cognitive cues, the Chinese pay more attention to the 
expectations of others regarding proper behaviour.26
There are two central insights to take from Yamagishi's theory. 
Firstly, values are not simply 'mental programming' but emerge from 
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interactions between social cognition and frames. Frames are generated 
by the institutions of society, so there is a strong impact on behaviour 
that goes beyond the direct impact of incentives and sanctions that 
undergird the institutions. This also means that behaviour can change 
rapidly if institutions, and consequently the framing effects, change. 
There is no strong and immutable effect of 'ingrained' values on peo-
ple. Secondly, and modifying this assertion, there are effects of social 
cognition on behaviour which channel the reactions of individuals to 
frames. This might result in cross-cultural differences in behaviour that 
are more persistent, but also more indirect. The distinction between 
ﬁeld-dependent and ﬁeld-independent cognition resonates with earlier 
distinctions the cultural theory, such as Hall's (1976) notion of 'high' vs. 
'low context' cultures.
There are different explanations of cognitive differences across peo-
ple. Nisbett himself proposes that these are deeply rooted in history. 
Related theories, also well-known in Chinese studies, emphasise the 
role of agrarian ecologies, especially the difference between rice grow-
ing communities and those working with wheat agriculture, with both 
historical and contemporary impacts. Obviously, the intermediating 
causal variables cannot be the ecologies per se, but the institutions that 
emerge under these conditions.27 As Yamagishi emphasises, the problem 
is how to explain the persistence of these ecological factors in a changed 
technological and social environment. One possible explanation might 
be institutional path-dependencies that retain causal power even if the 
ecological determinants no longer work. 
Now, one interesting consequence of this analysis is that such funda-
mental cognitive patterns may also affect the way theories about social 
structure and relationships are formed by scientiﬁc observers. In other 
words, research would turn reﬂective on a meta-level. This leads back to 
the question of how Fei Xiaotong anticipated recent advances in social 
psychology in his theory. Linking cognitive science and methodology in 
the study of culture has recently been advanced as a possible foundation 
for indigenous theorising in the management sciences, for example, in 
the context of the so-called 'Yin Yang' approach (see Fang 2012, Peter 
Li 2014; Li Xin 2014). This approach argues that the Yin-Yang model 
reﬂects a particular stance towards dialectical thinking that also has a 
direct impact on the way concepts are formed and applied in science. 
For example, the Hofstede approach clearly ﬁts with Fei's criterion of 
ascriptive group formation, as Hofstede assumes that all Chinese would 
ﬁt into the same category. In comparison, the Yin-Yang thinking would 
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render 'collectivism' as a ﬂexible aspect of behaviour that can easily co-
occur with other aspects, even those that are apparently contradictory. 
This means, in the context of this section, that one could argue that 
Yamagishi's ecological theory is itself the reﬂection of ﬁeld-dependence 
in theory formation.
Thus, we can conclude that the study of culture necessarily rests 
upon a multi-level entanglement between emic and etic approaches. In 
particular, the etic approaches may themselves be culturally embedded. 
Modern cognitive science provides the foundations for the indigenisa-
tion of cultural theory in opening the view on possible feedbacks be-
tween culturally bound cognitive stances and theory formation.
Guanxi and Chinese Individualism
I will now apply the conceptual framework developed thus far to the 
(in)famous notion of guanxi: allegedly a speciﬁcally Chinese pattern of 
social networks and related practices of network formation. However, 
the status of the term guanxi is ambiguous. In Chinese studies, there 
are inﬂuential and important usages, but also serious limitations. In 
the light of Fei's work, the notion of guanxi would mainly apply for 
rural society, suggesting substantial changes during urbanisation and 
modernisation. In contemporary urban society the term is often associ-
ated with corruption; accordingly, the prevalence of guanxi might be a 
transitory phenomenon reﬂecting weak institutions, especially lacking 
rule of law.28
However, beyond Chinese studies the term is experiencing a very 
strong intellectual career. This is mostly supported by the contributions 
by scholars with a Chinese background in management sciences (for 
a recent survey, see Chen et al. 2013). So there is still a need to clarify 
some aspects of guanxi. This should be done, however, against the 
larger background of Chinese studies. Whereas outside Chinese studies 
the term often assumes paradigmatic status, in Chinese studies it has 
been recently seen as only one phenomenon in a larger pattern that is 
traditionally denoted as the principle of li shang wanglai, which roughly 
translates as 'courtesy requires proper response'.29 
If we go back to standard deﬁnitions of guanxi, it is intriguing to 
observe that guanxi are actually an expression of egocentrism, in Fei's 
sense. This is important for two reasons. Firstly, guanxi are always 
relative to ego. For example, in Jacob's  inﬂuential guanxi model, what 
counts is 1) perceived and activated similarities between individuals 
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and 2) emotional foundations for instrumental relations (1982). For both 
reasons, we cannot simply equate guanxi with clientilist networks, which 
concentrate on one particular individual as a reference (a patron) or with 
categorial networks, which would deﬁne membership independently 
from the individuals in question (such as a professional association). 
Guanxi are egocentric in the sense that they are highly personalised, and 
this is further bolstered by emotional bonds that are not dependent on 
particular types of given social structures (such as the family), but which 
are created endogenously in contingent social interactions. Without 
discussing guanxi as such, Fei argued that notions such as 'neighbour-
hood' or 'family' may appear like 'groups' in the Western sense, but in 
fact are 'open circles of social relations' or shehui quanzi. This openness, 
ﬂuidity and egocentricity is a deﬁning feature of guanxi.30
Another important characteristic of guanxi is that they rest upon social 
creativity driven by individual actions. Guanxi are individual invest-
ments in social capital that is of the 'Burt type' in the ﬁrst place; that is, 
they bridge structural holes in networks to reap individual advantages.31 
Even if guanxi of this type coalesce into stable cooperative relations, the 
essential point remains that the agent who maintains the guanxi is the 
individual, and that beneﬁts of cooperation accrue to the individual 
(which means, these are collective goods, but do not necessarily imply 
altruism). In this sense, we cannot equate guanxi with collectivism, 
but with relational embeddedness that combines with individualistic 
motivations. Clearly, if an individual 'pulls guanxi' the motivation is 
always an individual one, and is not primarily deduced from higher 
level collectives in the network in question.
Thus, we can regard guanxi as a manifestation of Chinese individu-
alism combined with relational embeddedness, further conﬁrming the 
analytical value of the new conceptual framework. One direct expres-
sion of this fact is the autonomy of the individual relative to guanxi: 
individuals decide upon the use of guanxi, they are not imposed on 
them. There is no absolutely binding commitment to guanxi transcend-
ing all social domains. This is a point that has been emphasised in the 
literature from the outset, but is frequently neglected in viewing guanxi 
as reﬂecting a supposed group orientation of the Chinese.. This view 
can be also supported by analysing the indigenous terminologies and 
narratives surrounding guanxi, especially with regard to the core notion 
of the 'self' that engineers guanxi.32
I argue that the study of guanxi actually bolsters the revisionist char-
acterisation of the Chinese as 'individualists'. In this context, it is worth-
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while to look at the results of the most recent wave of the World Value 
Survey (WVS) in a little more detail. In the WVS, China, together with 
other 'Confucian societies', has a special position. Originally, the WVS 
was designed by R. Inglehart in order to construct a simple measure 
of 'modernity' on the societal scale (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). This 
effort resulted in a highly aggregate positioning of countries in a two 
dimensional map of 'modernity'. One dimension is deﬁned by the poles 
of 'secular rational values' and of 'traditional values', while the other 
is deﬁned by the poles of 'survival values' and 'self-expression values'. 
China is well advanced in the former dimension, but is still strong in 
survival values. It is most intriguing to see that this compares with the 
US and other English speaking countries (even cases such as Australia), 
which are still 'behind' China in terms of rationalisation, but far more 
advanced in self-expression values. China shares this peculiar position 
with other so-called 'Confucian' countries, in particular Japan, which ap-
pears to be the most 'rationalistic' country in the world, but still remains 
in the transition stage towards 'self-expression values'.33
It is worthwhile looking at a certain number of questions in more 
detail. In political science, one of the most reliable indicators for au-
thoritarian attitudes is the set of values that people maintain in educat-
ing their children. The WVS contains a series of questions that give a 
somewhat unexpected picture of the Chinese. I compare the results for 
China, the US, Germany and Russia. The most glaring observation is 
that the Chinese lead the pack in avoiding mention of 'obedience' as a 
value that ought to be taught to children. Both the US and Russia are 
above the average for this value in this group of countries. On the other 
hand, the Chinese and the Germans are above the average in naming 
'independence' as an important educational value, with the Chinese at 
79 per cent, only slightly losing out against Germany. This result ﬁts 
with other questions like whether the Chinese see themselves as being 
'autonomous persons', where close to 80 per cent agree, whereas more 
than 50 per cent of Russians disagree. Only Germans have a stronger 
voice here.
Other educational values emphasised by the Chinese mainly relate 
to the traditional values of thrift and hard work, and there is low em-
phasis on imagination and creativity. So, what emerges is a picture of 
an achievement-oriented, secular society that recognises the active role 
and responsibility of the individual in shaping his/her future.34 This 
picture is also conﬁrmed in general evaluations of the social context in 
which the Chinese perceive themselves. There is a pronounced belief, 
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especially comparing with Russia, that individual success is determined 
by individual effort, and less by luck and connections. This matches 
with the perception of guanxi as being part and parcel of individual 
strategies and less related to clientilist obligations being enforced on 
the individual. The Russian case is always an illuminating comparison 
here, because Russians tend to perceive society as a zero-sum game, 
compared with the Chinese who appear to be very optimistic about 
life chances for everybody. Thus, regarding guanxi we can say that the 
corrosive effect of corruption and clientilism on society is evident in 
Russia, but cannot be conﬁrmed for the case of China.
To summarise, guanxi, a term with a paradigmatic status, especially in 
Chinese management sciences, can be straightforwardly integrated into 
the three-dimensional scheme that I proposed previously and, in spite of 
afﬁrming the importance of interdependence among individuals, it is a 
clear indicator of 'individualism' as a core value in Chinese society. Yet 
guanxi simultaneously include aspects of relational embeddedness and 
verticality, along the lines of Fei's original chaxu geju notion. However, 
we can observe that 1) guanxi dynamics turn hierarchical differences 
into accessible social capital also for lower status individuals, thus also 
weakening the pure relationship of dependence, and 2) the diverse na-
ture of guanxi bases establishes forces of equalisation across hierarchical 
differences (such as shared native place equalising individuals with dif-
ferent status). This suggests important methodological consequences for 
understanding social structure. For example, a leading Chinese scholar 
in the ﬁeld, Zhai (2013: 35, 47), argues that in the Chinese context it is 
not possible to clearly demarcate the micro- from the macro-level, thus 
manifesting the fundamental property of 'continuity' (lianxuxing). This 
is another case in point for the meta-level feedback loops that emerge 
in entangling the emic and etic perspective.35
Chinese Religion
My second example of the entanglement between etics and emics in 
the study of culture is religious studies and the well-known difﬁculties 
of deﬁning Chinese religion. Here we observe an extremely interesting 
interaction between Western and Chinese conceptions that has even 
inﬂuenced the politics of religion in China. Empirically, we observe a 
paradox. In social science surveys, the vast majority of Chinese would 
designate themselves as being 'not religious'. At the same time, we notice 
a strong revival of religion in all shapes, in particular popular religion, 
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but also the spread of Christianity. The case of popular religion is par-
ticularly interesting, as the Chinese state has adopted a legal deﬁnition 
that does not recognise popular religion, but only accepts religions as 
deﬁned in a 'Western' sense, namely positing themselves within a formal 
organisation. These religions are also mainly seen as being 'modern' or 
in a modernised form (Islam possibly being the exception).36
If we reﬂect upon this phenomenon against the background of the pre-
vious analysis, it springs to mind that the current deﬁnition of 'religion' 
is categorial in nature; that is, it presupposes a clear-cut ascription of 
individuals to a certain religious belief system. Even when recognising 
the fact that in Chinese practice, these ascriptions often do not matter in 
the absolute sense, the requirement is at least that the 'religion' is repre-
sented as a category to which individuals might unequivocally refer. 
This creates the difﬁculties in catching the essence of Chinese popular 
religion, as has been emphasised early by Yang (1961) in characterising 
Chinese religion as 'diffuse'. In a number of important recent papers on 
this issue, Adam Chau has used the concept of 'polytropy' to understand 
the phenomenon that Chinese religious behaviour cannot be described 
in terms of a uniﬁed set of beliefs and institutionalised settings but ap-
pears as ﬂexible arrangements of practices that are aligned with different 
religious belief systems. These practices can be categorised into different 
types, called 'modalities': such as reading sacred texts or doing heal-
ing exorcisms. The modalities, however, are seen as reﬂecting generic 
religious needs individuals have (hence are not speciﬁc to the Chinese 
case).37 The practices themselves may be standardised, but their com-
bination reveals a high degree of individual autonomy and creativity, 
which reﬂects the concrete needs of the individual. An essential term 
for understanding Chinese religion is the 'efﬁcacy' (ling) of a practice, 
which is ultimately related to the fulﬁlment of an individual need, but 
which may be publicly recognised, thus motivating large numbers of 
followers. However, this behaviour is not based on assigning oneself 
to a public belief system, but to an experienced sequence of successful 
individual practices. 
Obviously, Fei Xiaotong's framework is applicable here. Chinese 
popular religion appears to be 'relational' and open-ended, being a 
sequence and open set of practices. In fact, we can even argue that the 
principles of guanxi apply to religion, because what matters is the ego-
centric networks of individual relations with a large number of places 
and deities, with which the individual stands in a long-term exchange 
relationship. The individual donates (for example, offering incense), and 
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the object of worship responds. This interpretation has been elaborated 
in much detail in Chang's 2010 analysis of the li shang wanglai framework, 
arguing that this does not only encompass social relations between the 
living, but also with the ancestors, and with deities and gods as well.
As Chau puts it in an illuminating comparison, whereas in Christianity 
the believer is host at Christ's table, in China the individual household 
hosts the gods and religious experts in order to pursue individual goals 
of prosperity and happiness.38 Indeed, his approach helps to explain 
much of the 'orthopraxy' vs. 'orthodoxy' controversy in Chinese studies. 
Practices are standardised and have to be observed, but they are modu-
larised, which means that standardisation can affect various practices 
in different ways (such as only affecting parts of the funeral rites, in 
James Watson's famous example), and second, their ultimate meaning is 
rooted in the social creativity of the individual actors, thus transcending 
standardisation efforts by the government.39 We can in fact grasp the 
distinct nature of Chinese religion in terms of Fei Xiaotong's dichotomy: 
Chinese religion manifests the egocentric nature of using and express-
ing practices as rituals, and it cannot be deﬁned according to abstract 
groups which identify themselves in terms of certain exclusive beliefs 
that are standardised in texts. So, Chinese religion is a clear expression 
of Chinese individualism. It is individualistic in terms of the egocentric 
use of rituals, and it is relationally embedded in being manifest in the 
social networks of different practitioners, religious experts, believers, 
spirit media, etc. 
Yet, there is one feature of Chinese religion that matches with certain 
characterisations of 'churches' in the West: this is the hierarchical or-
ganisation of the world of gods and ghosts mirroring the organisation 
of the Empire, the conceptualisation of a celestial bureaucracy and the 
fact of partial state control of rituals and religious organizations.40 It 
is straightforward to see this in the light of the verticality dimension. 
So, in current studies of Chinese religion, we ﬁnd three aspects of in-
dividualism, verticality and relational embeddedness conjoined, as in 
the characterisation of Chinese culture. 
Accordingly, Chinese popular religion can be seen as another mani-
festation of Fei's chaxu geju, also in the sense of balancing the aspects of 
horizontal networking and vertical order. It is probably for this reason 
that one particular analytical framework in understanding religion, the 
so-called 'religious market paradigm', has been fruitfully applied in the 
Chinese context. In this view, religious behaviour can be interpreted in 
terms of a supply and demand framework, and the speciﬁc structures 
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of competition. I do not claim strong validity for this approach, but 
evaluate the observation on a meta-level: the empirical validity of the 
religious market model needs to rest upon the basic assumption of in-
dividualism, hence individual autonomy of choice. So, its applicability 
can further support my interpretation of Fei's framework.41 
Conclusion
That Confucianism and collectivism go hand in hand is a common-
place and widely taught assumption about Chinese culture. I have not 
discussed the topic of Confucianism in this article, which concentrated 
instead on the empirical evidence regarding the 'collectivist' categorisa-
tion. This latter is important in Chinese studies because many researchers 
have recently discussed the 'individualisation' phenomenon resulting 
from recent reforms and social changes, thus implying that the starting 
point is a more 'collectivistic' orientation of individual values. Based on 
recent research in social psychology and cognitive sciences, I show that 
the 'individualism vs. collectivism' dichotomy is deeply misleading. I 
propose a multi-aspectual analytical approach that includes individu-
alism as a category that grasps the location of agency in individual 
perceptions and social beliefs, and treats collectivism as a value stance. 
To this I add the aspects of 'categorial vs. relational embeddedness' and 
'verticality vs. horizontality'. In this complex space, China attains the 
position of 'individualism' combined with 'relational embeddedness' 
in relation to 'collectivism', and 'verticality'. I further argue that this 
location is driven by the even more fundamental cognitive structures 
of ﬁeld dependence. 
This picture of Chinese culture concurs with Fei Xiaotong's indigenous 
theory almost exactly. So, one central ﬁnding of this article is that Fei's 
indigenous comparative theory of Chinese culture anticipated many of 
the insights of recent research on collectivism. This lends much support 
to clarion calls for the 'indigenisation' (bentuhua) of social and cultural 
research, which I interpret not only as 'ethnic indigenisation' but also 
as 'disciplinary indigenisation' (I already argued forcefully for this in 
Herrmann-Pillath 1996). The present discussion shows, as previously 
argued by Kulich (2010), that the study of culture needs to be based 
on triangulation approaches, conjoining emic and etic perspectives. 
The study of Chinese values runs the risk of serious errors if it is not 
combined with Chinese studies as generating conﬁrming evidence. One 
such error is to classify the Chinese as 'collectivists'. This categorisation 
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is widely used in management sciences, taught in cross-cultural train-
ings, and is used in economic and political science research on contem-
porary Chinese developments, apparently based on 'hard' quantitative 
evidence and sophisticated econometrics. Yet, feeding survey results 
about 'collectivism' into advanced statistical machineries may just be 
another instance of the 'garbage in / garbage out' fallacy. For example, 
if research on economic growth and social capital just takes quantitative 
data produced by common survey research as given, this may seriously 
distort not only our picture of China; it also affects the generalisation of 
results across countries (for instance, Bergren et al. 2008). 
A truly transdisciplinary approach to Chinese culture would balance 
quantitative and qualitative aspects, or emics and etics. I argue that 
this must also become the benchmark in disciplinary uses of culture, 
as in economics. Projecting disciplinary methodological standards on 
a phenomenon that is transdisciplinary in nature is like the proverbial 
metaphor of four blind men touching different parts of an elephant, re-
sulting in different and even incommensurable visions of the animal.
Carsten Herrmann-Pillath is Permanent Fellow of the Max Weber Center for 
Advanced Cultural and Social Studies, University of Erfurt, Research Professor 
of Economics and Evolutionary Sciences at Witten/Herdecke University, 
Germany, and Distinguished Visiting Professor of Schwarzman Scholars 
at Tsinghua University, Beijing. Research interests include economics and 
philosophy, institutional change and economic development, international 
economics, Chinese economic studies. He has authored 300+ academic papers 
and 16 books. His magnum opus China's Economic Culture: The Ritual Order of 
State and Markets is forthcoming with Routledge. Email: cahepil@online.de
NOTES
1  The research for this article was supported by the DFG-funded 'Research group on 
religious individualisation in comparative perspective' at the Max Weber Center 
for Advanced Cultural and Social Studies, Erfurt. I am grateful for suggestions and 
comments from my colleagues, especially Jörg Rüpke. Two anonymous reviewers 
raised important points, motivating a substantial change of perspective in the revised 
version.
2  I am referring to Fei's book Xiangtu Zhongguo (Fei 1947) which has been translated 
into English by Gary Hamilton and Wang Zheng under the title 'From The Soil: The 
Foundations of Chinese Society'. This translation raises interesting methodological 
issues, for example with reference to conceptualising the Chinese 'lineage' (see Har-
rell 2011). Hamilton (2014) puts Fei's thinking into the larger context of comparative 
studies on Western and Chinese culture.
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3  My approach is similar to Kulich's, who presented an overview of value studies 
building on both Western and Chinese research, especially focusing on the question 
of whether the etic standards of values, implied by using the same set of values across 
all cultures, needs to be modiﬁed by taking indigenous values into consideration 
(Kulich 2010; Kulich and Zhang 2010). The issue of indigenisation has been discussed 
intensively by Taiwanese psychologists, who argue in favour of a multi-dimensional 
approach to modernisation (see Yang 1989, 1998 and Hwang 2006).
4  See, for example, Yan 2010a. Case studies that highlight the paradox of individu-
alisation and authoritarian education have been presented by Lin 2011 and Hansen 
2013.
5  Tan (2010: 435ff) overviews different opinions in the Chinese literature, such as the 
idea that the traditional chaxu geju was based on moral order, whereas the modern 
chaxu geju is rationalised and hence 'instrumental'. Tan himself proposes the term 
gongjuxing quanceng geju that retains the ideas of social circles and hierarchical orders, 
but puts a 'family individualism' at the centre. Xiao (2010) goes back to a concept 
that was originally proposed by Fei himself in more recent work, the notion of 'dif-
ferential arenas' chaxuchang, which catches the observation that rural people maintain 
social interactions in different domains (chang) that follow different principles of 
structuration.
6  Interestingly, Fei's approach comes close to another Asian perspective by the Japanese 
scholar Nakane Chie, which was also applied on Chinese social networks by King 
(1994). Chie distinguishes between 'frames' and 'attributes' as criteria of forming 
groups, with 'frames' being clearly demarcated categories and 'attributes' shared 
properties and relations.
7  Harrell (2011) points out that the prevailing view on the Chinese lineage was deeply 
shaped by Maurice Freedman and his studies of Hong Kong lineages (cf. Stafford 
2000). Freedman transferred the standard conceptions of Western anthropology, 
not being aware of Fei's views. Fei distinguished between the patrilineal, i.e. sur-
name-based groups (shizu), the jiating  as the co-residential unit and the extended 
family (jiazu), arguing that the latter is built according to the open and ﬂexible 'circle' 
principle. Interestingly, he did not use the term zongzu . In fact, what Freedman 
analysed was the zong (which corresponds to the shi in Fei's usage), i.e. the formally 
constituted descent group, which therefore can be interpreted along the 'Western' 
perspective, thus overlooking the underlying, different Chinese principles of network 
organisation. Only much later anthropologists discovered the factual variety and 
plural structures of Chinese lineages, both in contemporary conditions (e.g. Cohen 
1990, who, based on ﬁeldwork in North China, also uses jiazu as translating 'lineage') 
and in history (for example, Ebrey and Watson 1986 distinguish between the jia as 
the economically active unit, the zu as the descent group including the matrilineal 
extension, and the zong as the formal principle of agnatic descent). What Freedman 
analysed as 'lineage' was the historical product also of active propagation of formal 
kinship organisation by the Imperial state, especially in South China (Faure 2007).
8  In his discussion of Fei's theory, Yan (2006) very much emphasises the rank order, 
criticising other interpretations of chaxu geju as overly emphasising horizontal net-
work relationships. He goes beyond Fei in even positing a 'chaxu personality' chaxu 
renge. I think that this throws the baby out of the bathwater in overemphasising the 
ofﬁcial Confucian views of this rank order. Yan rightly points out that status is always 
relative to ego, thus contextualised, which introduces a principle of indeterminacy. 
Further, however, as I will argue later, the two principles of cha and xu stay in a 
dynamic relationship, mutually balancing its impacts on actual behaviour.
9  The most recent version of Hofstede's work is Hofstede et al. 2010, which includes 
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references to many independent uses and modiﬁcations of the original IBM survey 
and comparisons with other survey approaches to culture. Hofstede has always been 
active as an academic entrepreneur. Simple explanations of his cultural dimensions 
and comparative data can be retrieved from his company's website http://geert-
hofstede.com/.
10 'Long term orientation' is still included as one single dimension in Hofstede et al. 
2010. The partitioning happened after another researcher who joined the Hofstede 
team, Minkov, related the Hofstede approach to his own research on values. The six 
dimensions can be found on the Hofstede websites, such as http://geert-hofstede.
com/national-culture.html.
11  The GLOBE approach is based on a large-scale coordinated survey effort with institu-
tionally independent research teams in 62 countries (House et al. 2004). In compari-
son, the original Hofstede survey was based on a single multinational company in 
a comparable number of countries. Later, additions and extensions of the Hofstede 
survey were never done in a similarly concerted effort. So, the Hofstede approached 
evolved through time, whereas the GLOBE survey is a systematic snapshot at one 
particular point of time. The two protagonists are involved in controversies, mutu-
ally criticising their methodologies (e.g. Javidan et al. 2006).
12  On this methodological issue, see Beugelsdijk and Maseland 2010, section 5.3.2. If 
values reﬂect marginal valuations, we can compare changes of values across time 
for one particular country, but we cannot compare absolute levels across countries. 
This means that the most basic goal of etic value research is impossible to attain.
13  Hofstede et al. (2010: 40) clearly acknowledge that cultural scores refer to the soci-
ety level exclusively, leaving much scope for individual variation. However, in his 
business applications the survey approach is also directly interpreted as generating 
information about individual-level characteristics. This is a major issue in criticising 
approaches such as Hofstede's, arguing that individual variation plays a systematic 
role in dynamically constructing culture (see Hong and Chiu 2001).
14  The 'dependence' paradigm was very inﬂuential in the literature on Chinese politi-
cal culture originating in seminal studies such as Solomon 1971 and popularised in 
contributions such as Pye 1988. In the original approach, psychological literature 
on child socialisation was directly related to observations on political institutions. 
Although this approach indeed made a point on how values might be explained 
empirically, it was later abandoned. Walder's classical analysis (1983, 1986) only 
concentrates on the institutional setting of Maoist and early post-Maoist society, 
especially at the urban workplace, in generating 'dependence'. As a description of 
traditional culture, the dependence paradigm was decisively criticised by Metzger 
(1977) who instead proposed the paradigm of 'interdependence'. 
15  Yan 2010b puts this observation against the background of recent sociological theoris-
ing about 'individualization' in 'reﬂexive modernisation'. In China, individualisation 
is often driven by 'forced disembedding' of individuals by the government and hence 
might even meet their resistance.
16  The most detailed and comprehensive critique of the Hofstede approach is un-
fortunately only available in German (see Behrens 2007). In meticulous detail she 
shows how Hofstede adapts and even distorts his data, combining them with often 
arbitrary interpretations of independent evidence, in order to end up in conﬁrm-
ing what are basically common stereotypes about countries such as the US, France 
or the Netherlands. In particular, Hofstede clearly reveals an ethnocentric bias in 
positively evaluating Western European and American culture, and therefore often 
suppresses or re-interprets data which do not ﬁt into the stereotypes. This is possible 
because Hofstede moves back and forth between statistical analysis, interpretations 
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of single survey questions, and higher-level typologies of countries. I cannot go into 
detail here.
17  As Behrens (2007: 78ff) shows, for example, regarding 'individualism' Hofstede 
arbitrarily assigns individualistic phenomena in South European Catholic coun-
tries to expressions of power distance or masculinity, whereas less individualistic 
phenomena in the US are simply swept under the carpet. For the seminal paper 
that launched the thorough revision of the individualism/collectivism dichotomy 
in psychology see Oyserman et al. (2002). In management sciences, there is also a 
thorough critique of the Hofstede dualism in pointing out that cross-cultural contacts 
create a fuzzy border across behaviours, which is further bolstered also by more 
fundamental cognitive patterns, which I discuss in the next section; for a pertinent 
critique, see Fang (2010). 
18  For a comprehensive survey of the literature, see Shavitt et al. 2012. The distinction 
goes back on Howard Triandis, one of the most inﬂuential psychologists work-
ing on the individualism/collectivism topic, see Triandis 1995. In comparison to 
Hofstede's or GLOBE's 'power distance', the verticality/horizontality distinction 
is not independent from the individualism/collectivism dichotomy, and it is not 
understood as a gradual scale with two poles. That means, combining the two di-
mensions results into four types of societies, which are themselves analytical, and 
not empirical categories.
19  For a summary of pertinent research, see Brewer and Chen (2007), and for an ap-
plication in the Chinese context Liu et al. (2010). The term 'categorial collectivism' 
was introduced in Herrmann-Pillath 2009: Brewer and Chen use 'group collectivism' 
which I ﬁnd less speciﬁc and therefore confusing. 
20  An exemplary study is Sanchez-Burks et al. (2003), who investigated the role of 
personal relations in workplace vs. non-workplace interactions and showed that 
differences between Americans and East Asians are more pronounced in a work-
place setting, with Americans paying signiﬁcantly less attention to relational cues. 
Workplace interactions also contribute to affect-based trust among Chinese subjects 
(see Chua et al. 2009).
21  On 'relational personalism', see Gabrenya and Hwang 1996. One can relate this to 
Charles Taylor's (1989) philosophical analysis of modern individualism. Taylor 
distinguishes two different European traditions, one is the rational form of indi-
vidualism, emphasising formal rights, autonomy of agency and so forth, and the 
other is the 'expressivist' tradition, which emphasises individual creativity in social 
relationships. This dualism persists until today, for example in the shape of liber-
tarianism vs. communitarism.
22  Behrens (2007: 80ff) has an extensive discussion of the methodological issues in 
constructing cultural typologies based on 'cultural dimensions' such as Hofstede's. 
For example, do countries with a similar score in 'power distance' also belong to one 
'type'? Or does the peculiar pattern of interaction between dimensions deﬁne types? 
The other possibility, which I favour, is to treat the dimensions only as analytical 
categories ('aspects'), and build the typology on other criteria, such as historical 
ones. 'Confucianism' then turns out to be a very weak category for deﬁning a 'type' 
for East Asian societies (see the contributions in Rozman 1991).
23  For an overview of this rich literature, see Bowles and Polonía-Reyes (2012). For 
example, framing effects determine whether a pecuniary sanction is perceived as 
a 'punishment' or a 'payment', implying market-like reciprocity. In the latter case, 
individualistic behaviour is bolstered. Behavioural ﬂexibility and contextualisation 
has been observed in criticising the Hofstede approach for long, see the overview 
in Fang (2010).
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24  The contextualisation of behaviour is also highlighted in the related approach of 
'dynamic constructivism' championed by Hong Ying-yi and colleagues (Hong et 
al. 2000, 2001). For example, they could show that certain value orientations switch 
in the case of bilingual Chinese subjects from Hong Kong, depending on which 
cultural stances are triggered by cues (such as Chinese vs. American icons).
25  See Nisbett (2003), building on empirical research such as Ji et al. (2000, 2004). These 
notions originated in earlier literature about the effects of the social environment on 
cognition, see, for example, Boyd and Richerson (1985: 178ff). 'Field dependence' can 
be empirically tested by means of standardised psychological tests such as the 'rod 
and frame test' where subjects have to identify the slope of a line put in alternating 
frames. In case of ﬁeld-dependence, the perception of the slope is more strongly 
inﬂuenced by the frame.
26  For an interesting experiment, see Chen et al. 2007, who work with the distinction between 
'idiocentric' and 'allocentric' attitudes and apply the so-called 'public goods game' in order 
to identify value orientations of individuals. In such games there are strong incentives for 
cheating. Chinese subjects react strongly when they perceive a group norm of cooperation, 
whereas American subjects exploit this information for individual beneﬁt. The authors 
distinguish this pattern from a pattern of 'group identity' in which the individuals would 
directly adopt group interests, which could not be conﬁrmed. Whereas the researchers 
think that these differences reﬂect 'cultural values', the results can also be explained in 
terms of different degrees of ﬁeld dependence.
27  This has been shown in the recent study by Talhelm et al. (2014) who provide 
empirical evidence for differences in terms of 'individualism', 'analytical thought' 
and so forth within China, with the different agrarian ecologies as the single most 
important causal factor of the differences. However, this argument has been put 
forward for decades in the Asian studies literature (for example, Wilhelm 1930), 
and can be even traced back to literary stereotypes about North and South China 
in Chinese tradition.
28  The classic treatment of guanxi, also in the rural/urban comparison, is Yang (1994). 
Guthrie (1998) presented the critical position arguing that globalisation is under-
mining traditional guanxi practices in the cities; this was partly refuted by Yang 
(2002), emphasising gender aspects and modern transformations of guanxi-based 
behaviour (see also Wank 2002). Further, the association of guanxi and corruption 
also means that guanxi practices might be work in the background and are unlikely 
to be openly thematised. This partly explains the career of the concept in the 1980s 
and 1990s, when Western researchers 'discovered' the guanxi term (see Gold et al. 
2002: 3ff), whereas Chinese informants were initially reluctant to refer to it.
29  On the li shang wanglai notion, see Chang (2010) who sees guanxi only as one aspect 
of Chinese social networks which is not necessarily positively evaluated. Another 
author who emphasises this larger framework is Stafford (2000). These studies focus 
on the rural areas where classical research of guanxi as networks of mutual support 
and gift giving have been realized, such as Kipnis (1996) or Yan (1996a, b). The 
expression li shang wanglai goes back to the Confucian classic 'Book of Rites' where 
it denotes the proper rules of reciprocity in a feudal status order.
30  The classical guanxi model has been developed by Jacobs (1982) and distinguishes 
between three 'guanxi bases', shared, but essentially arbitrary identities (tong), emo-
tional exchange (ganqing) and instrumental value. The emotional foundation turns 
guanxi dyadic, as relationships between individuals matter, whereas the shared 
identity renders networks open, as individuals can create a manifold of criss-crossing 
network identities. For a more recent model that matches with my short summary, 
see Chen and Chen (2004).
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31  On a related interpretation, see Li (2007). The notion of social capital as a means to 
gain individual advantage from network positions and relations is elaborated in 
Lin (2001). 
32  This role of the self has been elaborated clearly in King's 1994 inﬂuential analysis, 
which sees the 'self' ji as the 'architect' of social relations, which is reasserted by more 
recent management science receptions such as Chen and Chen 2004. Interestingly, 
this view matches with sinological studies of Confucian ethics such as Metzger 1977 
who emphasises the self as a moral agent. Hall und Ames (1998: 23ff) introduce the 
term 'focus ﬁeld self'. Regarding the practical management of guanxi, contributions 
as early as De Glopper (1978), and more recently Kipnis (2002), have emphasised 
that in many business relationships, the emotional commitment of guanxi is explicitly 
avoided in order to reduce the corresponding obligations.
33  The 'Inglehart-Welzel Cultural map' of the world can be retrieved from http://www.
worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp. For the subsequently reported data of 
the WVS, the WVS website offer an online data analysis service by which users can 
produce their own excel sheets and diagrams. The website also offers methodological 
background information. Research in China was realized by Shen Mingming and 
Yan Jie of the Peking University Research Center for Contemporary China. They 
applied advanced sampling methods that have also been applied and described in 
Whyte (2010).
34  Kulich (2010: Chapter 8)  conﬁrms evidence from other approaches to values stud-
ies, such as combining research into most cited proverbs and Schwartz's value 
survey. The Chinese always appear to emphasise individual performance, effort 
and responsibility for one's own fate.
35  Zhai (2011: 127ff) distinguishes between 'authority' ﬂowing from social structure and 
'ordinary life authority' resulting from guanxi, which can soften or even undermine 
the former. This observation puts Yan's (2006) view into perspective that verticality 
dominates the chaxu geju, in the sense of social structure shaping horizontal rela-
tions. Accordingly, Yang (1994) distinguished between 'arborean networks' and 
'rhizomatic networks', with the latter prevailing in China. 
36  For an excellent overview on the role of modernist ideologies in shaping the view on 
religion in twentieth century China, see Goossaert and Palmer (2011). For example, 
in the 1920s Buddhism reformed itself partly in following organisational patterns 
of Christian churches. On the contrary, almost all political elites and intellectuals 
condemned popular religion as being mere 'superstition', thus driving a deep wedge 
between the project of modernisation and nation-building on the one hand and on 
the other hand the full recognition of Chinese cultural tradition (compare Lagerwey 
2010: 154).
37  See Chau (2011, 2012, 2014). The term 'polytropy' was introduced into the study of 
religion by Michael Carrithers and refers to the observation that in many regions in 
the world, especially in Asia, 'believers' switch between different religious beliefs 
and practices according to their individual needs, so that there is no unique ascrip-
tion of individuals to certain mutually exclusive religious denominations. This 
happens even if the denominations themselves might be organised in church-like 
structures.
38  It is interesting to compare this analysis with Foucault's (2004: 177ff., 187) analysis 
of the 'shepherd' in Medieval Christianity. Here, absolute submission to the reli-
gious authority is required, leaving no individual choice of religious practices. The 
individual becomes a member of a religious community and loses its autonomy.
39  The orthodoxy/orthopraxy distinction was introduced by James Watson (1985/2004), 
see also Watson and Rawski (1988), into Chinese studies in order to understand the 
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speciﬁc interaction between religion and government control in China. The Imperial 
state allegedly focused on ritual control in certain sensitive areas ('orthopraxy') and 
did not interfere with the beliefs that people actually held even about those state-
controlled rituals. There is a lively debate over this view, see Sutton (2007) and the 
accompanying special issue of 'Modern China'.
40  On the ambivalent nature of this celestial bureaucracy, which mirrors the tension 
between orthopraxy and heterodoxy, that is deviant interpretations of religious 
symbols and practices, see the classical analysis by Feuchtwang 1992.
41  On applications of the model in Chinese contexts, see Yang (2006) or Lu et al. (2008). 
Chau (2011) also refers his model of modalities to the religious market model. Palmer 
(2011) is a thorough critique of the model arguing that the market paradigm does 
not cover the essential role of gift relationships in Chinese religion. This critique 
does not invalidate my point on individualism, but rather broadens the scope in 
including two different expressions of individualism (actually, in a Taylorian vein, 
Taylor 1986). Gift exchange is also driven by individual initiative and religious 
autonomy.
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